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Use this custom program instead of "`gpg`" found on `$PATH` when
making or verifying a PGP signature. The program must support the
same command-line interface as GPG, namely, to verify a detached
signature, "`gpg --verify $signature - <$file`" is run, and the
program is expected to signal a good signature by exiting with
code 0, and to generate an ASCII-armored detached signature, the
standard input of "`gpg -bsau $key`" is fed with the contents to be
signed, and the program is expected to send the result to its
standard output.
Specifies which key format to use when signing with `--gpg-sign`.
Default is "openpgp". Other possible values are "x509", "ssh".
Use this to customize the program used for the signing format you
chose. (see `gpg.program` and `gpg.format`) `gpg.program` can still
be used as a legacy synonym for `gpg.openpgp.program`. The default
value for `gpg.x509.program` is "gpgsm" and `gpg.ssh.program` is "ssh-keygen".
Specifies a minimum trust level for signature verification. If
this option is unset, then signature verification for merge
operations require a key with at least `marginal` trust. Other
operations that perform signature verification require a key
with at least `undefined` trust. Setting this option overrides
the required trust-level for all operations. Supported values,
in increasing order of significance:
* `undefined`
* `never`
* `marginal`
* `fully`
* `ultimate`
This command that will be run when user.signingkey is not set and a ssh
signature is requested. On successful exit a valid ssh public key is
expected in the first line of its output. To automatically use the first
available key from your ssh-agent set this to "ssh-add -L".
A file containing ssh public keys which you are willing to trust.
The file consists of one or more lines of principals followed by an ssh
public key.
e.g.:, ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
See ssh-keygen(1) "ALLOWED SIGNERS" for details.
The principal is only used to identify the key and is available when
verifying a signature.
SSH has no concept of trust levels like gpg does. To be able to differentiate
between valid signatures and trusted signatures the trust level of a signature
verification is set to `fully` when the public key is present in the allowedSignersFile.
Therefore to only mark fully trusted keys as verified set gpg.minTrustLevel to `fully`.
Otherwise valid but untrusted signatures will still verify but show no principal
name of the signer.
This file can be set to a location outside of the repository and every developer
maintains their own trust store. A central repository server could generate this
file automatically from ssh keys with push access to verify the code against.
In a corporate setting this file is probably generated at a global location
from automation that already handles developer ssh keys.
A repository that only allows signed commits can store the file
in the repository itself using a path relative to the top-level of the working tree.
This way only committers with an already valid key can add or change keys in the keyring.
Using a SSH CA key with the cert-authority option
(see ssh-keygen(1) "CERTIFICATES") is also valid.
Either a SSH KRL or a list of revoked public keys (without the principal prefix).
See ssh-keygen(1) for details.
If a public key is found in this file then it will always be treated
as having trust level "never" and signatures will show as invalid.